An Essay on Vengeance and Forgiveness
Theodore Y. Blumoff*
Who sees not that vengeance, from the force alone of passion, may be so
eagerly pursued, as to make us knowingly neglect every consideration of ease,
interest, or safety; and, like some vindictive animals, infuse our very souls
into the wounds of the enemy; and what malignant philosophy must it be,
that will not allow to humanity and friendship the same privileges which are
indisputably granted to the darker passions of enmity and resentment?**
Magnanimity, or a regard to maintain our rank and dignity in society, is the
only motive which can ennoble the expression of this disagreeable passion.***
Vengeance–the instinctive desire to get back at (settle the score with) the source of
one’s injury–is accompanied by the moral emotion of resentment and indignation, all of
which are natural psychological reactions.1 With others, I think these emotions rest on their
own bottoms; that is to say, they are not derivative of other emotions.2 We can and do give
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place to another. Cf. Smith TMS at 136-38 (noting that inanimate objects that “cause” injury can
become the object of our resentment). He also observed that the “intention or affection of the heart” is
all that should matter to assess blameworthiness, but he conceded that in “particular cases the actual
consequences which happen to proceed from any action, have a great effect upon our sentiments
concerning . . . merit or demerit, and almost always enhance or diminish our sense of both.” Id. at 134
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these emotions cognitive content;3 one hopes that they have developed and matured over
time with culture, but they are primitive.4 They arise when an individual suffers a nontrivial injury that was inflicted without excuse or justification.5 Among other injuries
suffered, the harm done discounts the value we hold of ourselves as human beings, so that
when this discounting (the crime or a substantial tort) occurs, our natural moral trip wires
are pulled.6 We react defensively; our worth as humans feels threatened. We hope then to
impose punishment. Over time we have elected (or otherwise permitted) agents to act for
us as surrogates and thus we avoid some of the costs entailed in the process of imposing
punishment. Forgiveness comes later, if it ever does. Though it is owed to no one, it seems
to reflect an effort to deal with these basic, adaptive reactions. I believe that, at least
sometimes, some among us can accept the compromised conditions necessary to grant
forgiveness with sufficient compassion and humility to justify this generosity. Ironically,
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Smith described the object of resentment as the need “[t]o bring him back to a more just sense of
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the ability to forgive could rest on principles of utility that respect these retributive
emotions; we might call it a kind of enlightened utilitarianism with a dash of teleology.
I try to untangle these issues by dividing the topic into three parts, beginning with
a brief and very basic outline of punishment theory: What are the moral justifications for
punishment? These are questions whose answers are central to moral theory and the
concept of forgiveness. Thus an understanding of their broad outlines is necessary to put
vengeance and forgiveness in their proper perspective. They are also increasingly informed
by our understanding of neurobiology. Next, I define vengeance, resentment and
forgiveness for purposes of this essay. Finally, I’ll try to tie the first two parts together by
asking what conditions, if any, might permit forgiveness or something like forgiveness to
occur in a legal context. The essay ends with a description of and prescription favoring a
sort of “Forgiveness-Lite.”
I.
Forgiveness roams the outskirts of law, and especially criminal law. As they stand
awaiting sentencing, for example, most convicted defendants use their moments of
allocution to assure the court that they now know they have made a terrible mistake, that
they have learned their lesson, and that they seek forgiveness. Their appeals often sound
genuine. And then they are sentenced, usually to a period of incarceration that the judge
already has determined to be appropriate. The point is not that all such pleas are
necessarily disingenuous; many (perhaps most) are, given the dictates of the setting and the
statistics on recidivism. It is possible, though, that some first time offenders really have
learned their lesson. Who knows? I don’t but it does not matter. The broader point is that
contemporary retributive justice demands pay back, and it usually is a stern and
unforgiving one. Compassion and forgiveness, if they come, must await the parole board.7
And there’s the rub: Forgiveness, from a moral point of view, makes sense theoretically as
a deontological conception, but from a practical point of view, the deontological conception
is unreachable in the absence of some utility.
Forgiveness is thus a troublesome topic for the criminal law, both practically and
theoretically. The public’s embrace of muscular retributivism–a form of vindictiveness that
variously couples retribution to some moral foundation or another8–makes it virtually
7
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impossible as a practical matter for politicians to embrace the compassionate side of their
own natures9–whether that side might reflect incarceration followed by a welcoming back
into the community to those who have paid their debt,10 or the recognition of the need for
incapacitation without punishment in light of prima facie neurobiological deficits. On the
theoretical side, it is unclear whether forgiveness is even necessary from a deontological
perspective.
But I am putting the cart before the horse. First I need to present a brief review of
the basics. The jurisprudential question we ask when we talk about theories of punishment
is, Why do we punish? What are the moral and rational justifications for this social
institution?11 What links pain inflicted with pain imposed? Writ large, these questions
traditionally find their answers within one of the two major theoretical foundations of
punishment: retribution and utility.
A. Retribution. Modernly we associate our understanding of retribution with
Kant and then Hegel and, more recently, with Peter Strawson and Herbert Morris.12

never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the purpose of another”). Mackie makes the
point, rightly I think, that retribution is natural instinct–an urge to hit back. J. L. Mackie, Morality and
the Retributive Emotions, 1 CRIM. JUSTICE ETHICS, 3 (1982). He also suggests that it promotes
cooperation in the long (evolutionary) run. An analogy that I find helpful is to think of retribution as if it
acted similarly to a vine of poison ivy: You can destroy the plant by touching or walking through it, but it
will leave its deterrent effect with you in the form of a terrible rash that will put you on guard not to
touch it in the future. It is a post-facto (even post death) method for maintaining its life in the long run.
Cf. Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, FORGIVENESS AND
MERCY 139-40(Cambridge 1988).
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Retributive theorists elaborate different conceptions of the fierceness of retributive goal,13
but the transcendent principle of morality goes way back and it is associated with the
familiar notion of “desert:” The wrongdoer deserves the punishment society imposes on
him because he has injured someone without sufficient justification–he wasn’t doing
something we approve of–or excuse–he wasn’t grossly defective in his cognition or (in some
jurisdictions) volition. The major underlying premise is Kantian: Every person, by virtue
of his or her humanity alone, is an autonomous and rational decision-maker capable of
doing good because we all possess a will that is capable of unsurpassed goodness. Those
capacities–autonomy and rationality–are the bottom-line measures of our moral worth.
That being the case, one logical inference is that when an actor commits a wrong,
he’s presumed to have exercised the unfettered choice to commit (or not to commit) that
wrong, absent gross and verifiable deficiencies. A second inference follows: If the
wrongdoer then chooses to break the law, he violates our equal worth, and thereby gains
(or potentially gains) an undeserved advantage or benefit for which he must be pay; that is
how we honor his humanity. (Obviously, “gain” and “benefit” are problematic ideas;14 for
present purposes we can include within these notions the sense that the wrongdoer at the
least has elevated his worth or entitlement above his victim’s.15) Three conclusions then
follow: First, punishment–the intentional, societal infliction of physical harm upon,
and/or the deliberate, intrusive confinement of the wrongdoer–is at least morally
permissible (if not obligatory) under these circumstances; second, the harm society imposes
on the wrongdoer must be rationally and morally defensible as proportionate to (as
“fitting”) the wrong done; and third, traditionally, the purpose of punishment may not be
utilitarian–punishment is aimed at the individual wrongdoer and no one else.16 This last
point is of potential importance here because retributive theories of punishment must have
their origin in some non-consequentialist foundation rooted in a universally applicable, à
priori conception of justice: It is a categorical imperative. The use of tools such as
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Mackie, supra note –, at 4, describes three variants of retributivism: negative, “the principle
that one who is not guilty must not be punished” (that is, guilt is a necessary condition for punishment);
permissive, “one who is guilty may be punished” (guilt is a sufficient condition for punishment); and
positive, “one who is guilty ought to be punished” (guilt obligates the state to punish). He also adds a
“quantitative variant” to the mix: “[E]ven one who is guilty must not be punished to a degree that is out
of proportion to his guilt, that one who is guilty ought to be punished in proportion to guilt, or may be
punished in proportion to his guilt.”
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rehabilitation, simple constraint, and deterrence (specific or general) is impermissible.
Kant defined his own approach to punishment with the Latin phrase, jus talionis, the
“right of retaliation,” which he took quite seriously. Kant maintained famously that
imposing the death penalty was a categorical necessity following a conviction for homicide:
Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its
members–as might be supposed in the case of a People inhabiting an island
resolving to separate and scatter themselves throughout the whole world–the
last Murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before the resolution
was carried out. . . . If they fail to do so, they may be regarded as accomplices
in this . . . violation.17
Kant provides several reasons for this harsh-sounding command but most important was
that imposed death was a simple metric: Death was the only punishment proportioned to
the harm done, and to fail to impose the only proportionate punishment available would
violate the categorical prohibition against using a person merely as a means to an end. That
is to say, the failure to impose the death penalty would indicate a failure to respect the
autonomy of the wrongdoer, and that failure would make accomplices of those who fail to
effect the appropriate punishment. In essence, we would be condoning the crime and
affirming the dis-value of the victim. And to treat someone who committed a crime as a
means to an end–that is, to impose punishment for the sake of deterring others or simply
constraining the wrongdoer or hoping to educate the wrongdoer–violates the wrongdoer’s
“Inborn Personality,” which deserves respect “although he may be condemned to lose his
Civil Personality.”18 Yes, we will hang him.
What is important to note is that the moral foundation of retributivism is wholly
formal and detached.19 The unsurpassing nature of the good will, of rationality and

17

Kant, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note # –, at 198.
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Id. at 195.
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Kant articulated the basic problem he was addressing in his GROUNDWORK PRINCIPLES OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS this way:
Do we think it a matter not of utmost necessity to work out for once a pure moral
philosophy completely cleansed of everything that can only be empirical and appropriate
to anthropology? That there must be such a philosophy is already obvious from the
common Idea of duty and from the laws of morality. Every one must admit that a law
has to carry with it absolute necessity if it is to be morally valid, that is, as a ground of
obligation.
H. J. Paton, trans., KANT’S GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORAL 55 (New York 1873).
Among the most valuable exegeses on Kant’s text is John Rawls, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL
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autonomy, are a priori standards that are and (in fact) can be only hortatory. For real
people, intellectual and volitional capacities are distributed along familiar, standard
measures.20 Some very thoughtful research in the neuropsychology and neurobiology of
morality and cognition supports the notion that retribution as applied either serve goals
that are also utilitarian,21 and that both retribution and utility have neurobiological
correlates that vary depending upon the nature of the moral problem.22
B. Utility. Where Kant and traditional retributivists generally recoil at the idea of
using a person solely as a means to a social end, Bentham and the utilitarians could
conceive of no reason other than aggregate social benefit as a goal of punishment. The
argument is uncomplicated:
The general object which all laws . . . ought to have . . . is to augment the total
happiness of the community; and, therefore, in the first place, to exclude, as
far as may be, every thing that tend to subtract from that happiness: in other
words, to exclude mischief.
But all punishment is mischief; all punishment is evil. Upon the
principle of utility, it ought to be admitted . . . only . . . in as far as it promises
to exclude greater evil.23
So we can summarize Bentham’s argument as follows:
(i) All laws should promote happiness, i.e., aggregate social gain;
(ii) Punishment itself doesn’t promote happiness;
(iii) Therefore, laws requiring punishment should be enforced
only when doing so otherwise promotes happiness, i.e., when they
produce a net social gain.
Despite his simplicity, Bentham did not oppose retribution in all its aspects. He rejected

PHILOSOPHY 148-289 (ed. by Barbara Herman; Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2000) .
20

See, e.g., Matt Ridley, NATURE VIA NURTURE: GENES, EXPERIENCE, & WHAT MAKES US
HUMAN passim (HarperCollins 2003).
21

See, e.g., Eyal Aharoni and Alan J. Fridlund, Not Just Retribution” The Role of Behavior
Control in Third-Party Punishment, mss in author’s possession.
22

Joshua D. Greene et al., The Neyural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral
Judgment, 44 NEURON 389 (2004) (using fmri data to demonstrate that different areas of the prefrontal
cortex are recruited to solve difficult issues of personal morality).
23

Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in J. Bowring, ed., THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM Ch. XV, §1, at 83 (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843).
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its use as a general moral justification for punishment, but he understood that vengeance
was a powerful motivator that could produce useful consequences: “It is the vindictive
satisfaction which often unties the tongue of the witnesses; . . . which generally animates
the breast of the accuser; and engages him in the service of justice, notwithstanding the
[many] expenses.”24
The basic theoretical distinction retributivists and utilitarians is this: For
retributivists, treating a person merely as a means to a social end is immoral; it denies the
autonomy and rationality of the wrongdoer, formally conceived. For utilitarian theorists,
not only is treating a person as a means morally permissible, it is generally the only morally
permissible goal of punishment, which is justified to end mischief if, but only if, the
mischief is sufficiently great that failing to punish it would threaten the common good. For
the retributivist, the state’s punishment machinery can be described as a kind of “sanitized
revenge,” that is, it serves as a substitute for the kind of “simple revenge” that might
otherwise occurs when “family members of the injured or the injured himself retaliates
against the wrong-doer.”25 From the viewpoint of utilitarian theory, punishment serves the
aggregate good when it acts to prevent future harm the possibility of which outweighs the
harm done by punishment itself.
II.
We humans have recognized almost from our recorded beginnings that human life
is vulnerable to invasion and harm by the acts of others, and that the basic remedy for this
kind of invasion–vengeance–is an appropriate counter-invasion.26 The evidence strongly
suggests that this counter-invasion disposition–the “fight” half of the “fight or flight”
response–is a potent adaptive reaction.27 Ethologists have suggested that punishment

24

The “radical defect” of retaliation, according to Bentham, was its “inflexibility,” and its
tendency, at least in some class of cases, to “err on the side of excessive severity.” Bentham, supra note
# – , Pt. II, Bk. I, Ch. IX.
25

Andrew Oldenquist, An Explanation of Retribution, 85 J. PHILOS. 464, 473 (1988) (arguing that
retribution fills a moral need in a community as long as conditions of fair process exist).
26

Martha Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, in SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 157-58 (Oxford 1999).
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See, e.g.,Joseph LeDoux, SYNAPTIC SELF: HOW OUR BRAINS BECOME WHO WE ARE 7-8
(Penguin 2002) (discussing the role of the amygdala in reaction to fear engendering stimuli); Laurence
Tancredi, HARDWIRED BEHAVIOR: WHAT NEUROSCIENCE REVEALS ABOUT MORALITY 65 (Cambridge
2005); Isaac M. Marks, Randolph M. Neese, Fear and Fitness: An Evolutionary Analysis of Anxiety
Disorders, 15 Ethology and Sociobiology 247 (1994); John C. Wingfield et al., Ecological Bases of
Hornone-Behavior Interactions: The “Emergency Line History Stage, 38 AMER. ZOOL. 191 (1998)
(discussing the biology of freeze reactions to threatening conditions).
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makes cooperative adaptation possible.28 Kant called this reaction to injury retaliation;
Smith spoke of resentment and punishment; others call it vengeance or revenge.
Revenge should be a personal right. After all, if retaliation is appropriate in any
context, it is owed to and ought to be carried out by the individual harmed. It is not always
confined to the individual, however; frequently, it is carried out by groups with an historical
axe to grind.29 Because groups tend to over-punish, we try to confine it’s imposition to the
governing authorities. But I want to bracket the political context and define it in narrower
terms:
Vengeance is the rational act of getting back at, or desiring to get back at,
the person who inflicts a non-trivial harm, where the harm may be physical
(with all the variations we can think of in that realm); it may be
proprietary; or it may be psychological, that is, some physical or verbal act.
In each case, the injury suffered diminishes its victim self esteem such that,
in any context, the victim wants to assert or reassert the denial of
devaluation.
Forgiveness, in contrast, is a harder concept to corral because if it is a virtue, which
is debatable (some argue that it is supererogatory30), it is acceptable only in fairly
circumscribed contexts. In contrast to vengeance, which is often a collective process (think
about ethnic cleansing), forgiveness is necessarily interpersonal; that is, I think it can exist
only between two people of relatively equal moral or legal footing.31 It makes no sense to
me to talk about forgiving a person who has not inflicted a harm directly on me. I may be
appalled and think very little of white South Africans who oppressed black South Africans
by apartheid or of those who implemented and carried out Jim Crow laws in the American
South, and I might think it is a horrible invasion when someone steals something from a
family member or friend; however, I do not see how I could forgive anyone in any of these
contexts when they’ve either stopped or been stopped: I was never stung by it. So in

28

See, e.g., Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson, Solving the Puzzle of Human Cooperation, in ,
S. Levinson, EVOLUTION AND CULTURE 105( MIT Press 2005); Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson,
Punishment Allows the Evolution of Cooperation (or Anything Else) in Sizeable Groups, 13 ETHOLOGY
& SOCIOBIOLOGY 171 (1992). Both articles are available on-line at
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/boyd/Publications.htm.
29

For a disturbing discussion of collective violence in the Hindu-Muslim context, see Sudhir
Kakar, THE COLORS OF VIOLENCE: CULTURAL IDENTITIES, RELIGION, AND CONFLICT (Chicago 1996).
30

See Jeffrie G. Murphy, GETTING EVEN: FORGIVENESS AND ITS LIMITS 36-8 (Oxford 2003)
(discussing the issue of whether the obligation to forgive is conditional or unconditional).
31

This does not mean that we cannot feel reactive emotions vicariously; clearly we can. See
Strawson, supra note # –, at 70-2.
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contrast to vengeance, forgiveness makes sense only if it’s granted by the party who suffered
the injury.
Forgiveness begins with an effort to overcome the harm that generates resentment.32
I frame it that way because resentment is an emotion that naturally follows an injury,
especially and intentional one. Adam Smith spoke to the origins of resentment in THE
THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS in 1759. His idea still rings true.
What chiefly outrages us against the man who injures or insults us is the little
account which he seems to make of us, the unreasonable preference which he
gives to himself above us, and the absurd self-love, by which he seems to
imagine that other people may be sacrificed at any time to his convenience or
his humor.33
It may well be that the actor who causes this feeling of diminution was operating carelessly
rather than intentionally. Nonetheless, our reactions are of such a nature that we tend to
attribute wrongdoing to the character of the individual who caused our injury.34
Before turning to the circumstances under which forgiveness may be appropriate,
there is a bit more underbrush to remove. First, it is important to note that forgiveness is
not a legal concept; mercy, in the form of clemency or pardon, affects the legal process, but
mercy is not necessarily an act of forgiveness. Often, I think, pardon (in particular) reflects
a miscarriage of justice for which the prosecution ought to seek forgiveness; at any rate,
clemency and pardon are political acts not legal ones. What makes forgiveness difficult is
the fact that if it is not deserved, it does not look like a virtue at all; and when it apparently
is deserved, it may not be necessary, at least in theory.
III.
This last point is teased out by Aurel Konai, who begins by making an important
distinction between forgiveness and condonation.35 Condonation occurs when a person
clearly knows that someone else has done wrong–he’s harmed someone else without
justification or excuse–and the condoner disapproves of the wrongdoer’s conduct, but she
nevertheless refrains from taking any action that signals disapproval, and she knows she’s
refraining. Condonation is close to what we might call an excuse in legal or moral
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Jeffrey Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in Murphy and Hampton, supra note # –, at 15-

33

Smith, THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note –, at 139.

34

See infra text accompanying note–.
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Aurel Kolnai, Forgiveness in ETHICS, VALUE, & MORALITY: SELECTED PAPERS OF AUREL
KOLNAI 215-16 (ed. by F. Dunlop and B. Klug; Hackett Publ. Co. 1978).
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terminology because, in circumstances that warrant an excuse, we both disapprove of the
conduct and refuse to visit blame on the wrongdoer, but we assume this stance because the
wrongdoer suffers from some gross and verifiable cognitive or volitional deficit.36
Forgiveness, in contrast, does not nullify either the wrongdoing or the blameworthiness of
the act; forgiving does not and must not acquiesce in the offense. To be justified,
forgiveness has to face the wrong squarely–weak responses are not tolerated. In fact, if the
person wronged does acquiesce in the offense (condonation), that person commits an
offensive act of spinelessness: He permits the wrongdoer to walk all over him.37
When one unravels the Kantian premises on which secular conceptions of
forgiveness rest, from the moral point of view one finds an apparent paradox. That
conclusion begins with the Kantian notion that everyone is entitled to full respect as
rational and autonomous individuals, which is the basic premise of retribution. Since we
punish to honor the fact of each individual’s humanity,
we should forgive if, but only if, the wrongdoer genuinely acknowledges the
wrongfulness of his act (he expresses sincere regret) and he promises
solemnly and in a sustained way not to treat the victim as he had.
Forgiveness thus requires some performative act–an admission of wrong-doing, a plea for
forgiveness and so on. If the wrongdoer goes through this kind of process, we once again
accept him as a person worthy of full moral (and legal) respect. And now the paradox: If
the wrongdoer actually has mended his ways, then the injured party is required to accord
the wrongdoer the full respect his humanity deserves, in which case forgiveness is
unnecessary and redundant.
Can the utilitarian exercise forgiveness? Can there be an aggregate social gain
attributed to forgiving wrongdoers? Or, conversely, might we simply be encouraging
wrongdoing if wrongdoers know they can receive forgiveness without genuine expressions
of sorrow and be united again in the moral community? If utilitarians can embrace
forgiveness, it cannot be embraced easily on the terms just described, but perhaps it can be
justified on its own terms if the wrongdoer views forgiveness as a positive or pro-virtue. If,
however, utility incorporates the individual in its moral calculations only as an
instrumental contributor to the common good–that is, as one of the many units that
maximize aggregate preferences–then it is difficult to envision how forgiveness, defined
roughly as welcoming the wrongdoer’s return to full moral status, works in a utilitarian
system. The basic point is that forgiveness is based on moral respect for the individual,
which is problematic from most rigorous utilitarian perspectives.
The orthodox view of forgiveness presented here rests on the idea that we can
36

See, e.g., ” J. L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 PROC. ARIST. SOC’Y 1 (1956).
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;See Smith, supra note # –, at 45 (“A person becomes contemptible who tamely sits still and
submits to insults, without attempting either to repel or to revenge them.”).
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overcome our natural desire for revenge and feelings of resentment, which reactions may
be hard-wired to some extent.38 But to what extent? One question that needs asking is
whether, in theory, our retributive emotions must always constrain public policy. The
answer is unclear. Smith describes punishment, an institutionalized kind of revenge, as the
“natural gratification” of resentment. What does “natural” entail? One interpretation of
Smith, the more restrained one, holds that at least some among us have some choice as to
whether or not we act on these natural impulses and, if we do, how and to what extent we
act them out. So “natural,” on this view, is not synonymous with all-out revenge. A second
and huskier view holds that the naturalist bases of this emotion demand a muscular form
of retribution, for example, mandatory minimum incarceration up to and including capital
punishment.39 For Hume, in contrast, the distinction between the naturalist origins of our
moral sentiments and the need to act on them is clearer: Although an individual’s moral
sentiment of anger and resentment is always directed at the past, punishment always lies
in the future; it becomes necessary only when the transgressor “renders himself by his
crimes, obnoxious to the public.” When a publicly condemned wrong occurs, then we may
suspend the ordinary “rules of justices are . . . for a moment, and it becomes equitable to
inflict [punishment] on him, for the benefit of society.”40 For Hume, then, following
unjustified injury there is always an, additional forward-looking question about the need
for punishment, which (of course) always has at the very least a minimal retributive feature
to it. Although there is some tension here between the idea that our sentiments of
resentment are part of our basic human constitution, and the question whether or not those
sentiments can be suspended in the practice of punishment, still both seem to allow for
some choice at least about the extent of one’s resentment and at least for some people some
of the time.
A second question then is whether maintaining resentment, holding onto what Jean
Hampton called that “defiant” attitude–“You’ve outraged me by giving an indefensible
preference to yourself over my being and you had no right to do so, you rotten S&b, and I’ll
. . .”–is a necessary feature of just punishment? Or should we try to provide a different,
more compassionate strategy, knowing as we do so (i) that some sufficient portion of the
polity can overcome these natural emotions, (ii) that some of the conditions for granting
forgiveness will not be fully met, but recognizing (iii) that all conditions must be met to
some extent otherwise we sacrifice our moral sensibilities far more than we should? When
do forgetting and moving on enter our thoughts? Are “forgetting” and “moving on”
morally weak combinations, akin to condonation? Or, . . . is “moving on” to some extent
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See Lawrence Tancredi, HARDWIRED BEHAVIOR: WHAT NEUROSCIENCE REVEALS ABOUT
MORALITY36-6 (Cambridge 2005) (discussing the role of the amygdala in our emotional reactions ).
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See Paul Russell, Hume on Responsibility and Punishment, 20 CAN. J. PHILOS. 539, 559-60

(1990).
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David Hume, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 187 (L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, eds.; Oxford:Clarendon Press 3rd ed.
1975) (emphasis in the original).
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a kind of bio-social or pro-social necessity? And, if the latter, when is the overall public
welfare served well by forgetting and moving on, even if all the formal conditions for
forgiveness can be met only partially? That is what often occurs, for example, when parole
is granted; the conditions of good behavior and a willingness to take responsibility, which
are steps toward earning juridical forgiveness, are usually necessary conditions for parole.
Certainly there are some people for whom, and there may be some offenses for
which, forgiveness and reconciliation just are not possible. From the vantage of criminal
law, for example, individuals who lack either basic impulse control or a conscience or both
don’t seem to be candidates for forgiveness. That kind of outlier–the predatory psychopath,
for example–doesn’t live within the moral realm and so is outside the realm of forgiveness.
And on the offense side, an actor who assassinates or attempts to assassinate the president
of prime minister may repent and may even have earned a kind of forgiveness, but he can
forget about ever getting out of prison assuming he escapes execution. At the other end of
the spectrum are those who are basically decent people for whom the wrongdoing is an
isolated act, or an act that may recur but only in fairly isolated conditions. But what of
individuals who are in an existing relationship when a resentful act occurs, but for whom
the relational benefits are sufficiently important that when the reactive emotions are
triggered (because trust and esteem have been broken), some reconciliation is desired? The
problem here is that the existence of the retributive emotions and the possibility of
reconciliation are clearly in psychological tension and may be–if we expand generously on
Joshua Greene’s data about the variable neural correlates for moral problem solving that
reflect retributive and utilitarian approaches to such dilemmas–in neurobiological
tension.41 All of this suggests that the desired resumption of cooperative relations is going
to be difficult. So then the question is: At what point might trust and moral equality be
sufficiently re-established to forgive?
Here we can move away from criminal law and consider examples of how these
problems arise in a hypothetical commercial and personal relationship. Suppose that Ron
owns and runs Company A, which has a long term supply contract with Barb, who owns and
runs Company B: Ron’s company needs the product Barb’s company supplies. Now
assume that Barb reneges on a deal; she breaks a promise (her company breaches its
contract with Ron’s company) and the breach causes an injury to Company A. Ron has lost
some measure of trust Barb, and he’s angered and feels somewhat diminished by her
apparent disregard. If Barb expresses genuine regret, provides an intelligible but nonexcusing explanation,42 and pledges not to breach Ron’s trust in the future, Ron’s
41

Some support for this view comes from experiments by Greene and others. See, e.g., Joshua D.
Greene et al., The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment, 44 NEURON 389,
398 (2004) (finding neural correlates for solving certain moral dilemmas from deontological and
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For example, Barb may explain that her company was strapped for cash when a better offer for
her product was received. She will not claim that the contract breach arose because she lacked the
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forgiveness and reconciliation could have a favorable effect on their relationship. In this
sense, forgiveness may serve a consequential goal, namely, making Barb a more reliable
partner in the future. Now, some Kantians might view this as a crass outcome–using Barb
instrumentally–but it seems to me that it serves the entirely permissible goal of influencing
future behavior for the betterment of everyone.43
But what if Barb’s explanation consists of telling Ron that she received a better offer
from another buyer, Company C? Full stop! No further explanation. She may still express
regret and she may even give her pledge not to breach her promises in the future, but
forgiveness seems questionable and reconciliation fairly dubious; she has admitted no
wrongdoing. Ron may still need to reconcile; it may be that no other supplier can meet his
company’s needs, for whatever reason. But is the “reconciliation” that occurs even genuine,
or simply a descent into a mutual, temporary modus vivendi? Is there any reason to
suppose that Barb will not repeat her behavior again whenever she finds a better price for
her product? I think the hard question is whether reconciliation under this scenario will
actually make things worse by, in effect, condoning Barb’s promise breaking.
Just how hard this process can be is well illustrated by the kind of mediation that
occurs routinely among married couples. Now suppose Barb and Ron are spouses. Ron,
the dirty scoundrel, is still trying to maximize his reproductive success, only he’s doing so
with “other” women and despite the fact that he has what’s at least an average marriage of
10 or 12 or 15 years and, say, two kids. Now the relationship of trust is deeply personal and
it has been severely compromised: Barb may no longer be able even to imagine trusting
Ron again when he says he’s working late or going out with the guys. Can reconciliation
occur without some genuine expression of sorrow? Or will they have to satisfy themselves
with either a divorce or a shaky modus operandi?44
Forgiveness and reconciliation are acts of beneficence. No one can claim an
entitlement to forgiveness and to bestow them, the forgiver (for example, Barb as the victim
of her husband in the last hypothetical) has to believe that she’ll achieve a good outcome.
That doesn’t mean she should forgive Ron in order to improve him, because I think that
would devalue her act of kindness and could bring about the worst kind of
outcome–namely, forgiving someone who views forgiveness as a weakness amounting to

capacity to comply; she is not seeking an excuse. Rather, she may explain that the conduct that
constituted the breach was a one-time phenomenon, she may express genuine regret, and she may seek
forgiveness.
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condonation. Whether it can be done at all is answerable only in each specific context and
with access to a substantial set of facts.
IV.
Perhaps, one might object, we should distinguish between the actor towards whom
we feel resentment for diminishing us, and the act, and then focus on the latter. After all,
that is precisely the stance taken by some Christians when they address an issue like
homosexuality: Love the sinner, hate the sin! So now, forgiveness does not presuppose
resentment or even a negative attitude toward the offender, but toward the offender’s
wrongful action.45
Although one hears this plea frequently, there are several problems with it. First, at
least in the context of homosexuality and perhaps other phenomena that deal with sexual
orientation, it tends to collapse the distinction between wrongdoing and illness; the
wrongdoer, on this view, is necessarily sick. So there is something troubling to me about
this approach. In criminal law, for example, we routinely require both a voluntary harmful
act (or a voluntary act that causes harm) and a culpable state of mind; except for strict
liability crimes, we are told never to detach the actor’s mental state from the act.46 If it were
permissible to distinguish between the actor and the act, then I think we’d have to ask
frankly when, if ever, moral condemnation of an actor is appropriate. And, of course, if
condemning the actor (as opposed to the act) is never appropriate, then punishment and
moral philosophy are just damaging and ridiculous endeavors. I think the whole approach
is semantically and logically suspect: At least in this context, it confuses an act with a status,
which, as a matter of criminal law, it is constitutionally impermissible to punish.
Second, even if this sort of distinction were permissible, it might be psychologically
impossible for the victim to make it: After all, we resent the author of the harm for doing
something, and that something is wrong. When resentment is an appropriate moral
emotion, rarely do we condemn the offender’s action and retain a bullish mental attitude
toward him as a person; excusing conditions excepted, usually it is only for our children and
loved ones that we balance such dichotomous feelings as a part of their education in moral
norms. We are resentful at the actor for his wrongful act, for devaluing us. Moreover, we
tend to over-attribute a bad character to the actor who produced these injuries.47 As a result
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That this approach provides ample room for fudging is well documented. See, e.g.., Mark
Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981)
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Page 15 of 17

of these and other forces, we want to see him defeated, in some way; defeating the
perpetrator is the corrective that vindicates our own, pre-injury appraisal of worth, a point
Jean Hampton and Nico Frijda make persuasively. I suspect that is why a number of
philosophers who have written about forgiveness argue that to grant it, the offender has to
be worthy of it; as a pre-condition, he has to undertake some visible performative act–some
combination of admission of guilt, of blameworthiness or whatever–that reflects that fact
that he deserves the rebuke or punishment. That visible performance distances the
wrongdoer from his offensive act, and in doing so, he actively separates himself from the
offense; that act allows both the victim and (one hopes) the offender to retain their negative
attitudes toward the act, but it may also permit the victim to see the offender in a new (and
forgiving) light.48
Can some of the newer institutions of punishment and sentencing, such as victimoffender conferencing and even victim impact testimony, serve to reduce the moral hatred
and desire for vengeance that often follows criminal victimization? Retributivism, of which
forgiveness is a part, has little room for compassionate responses to wrongdoing in today’s
criminal justice system: It is as if our theoretical and practical reasoning capacities are at
war with one another. However much we may adopt retributivism as a theory with
transcendent moral and legal authority, each of us wants safe streets for ourselves, our
families, our communities and our nations. And for many, retribution fulfills this personal
preference.
That forgiveness may have a utility–(roughly) “get over it and move on”–suggests
that we give more attention to the interface between retribution and utility as moral
justifications for punishment, and less time debating these issues as if they were either-or
propositions. There is some fascinating research on the neural bases for engaging in moral
decision-making, all of which suggest that (i) our emotions play a major role in decisionmaking,(ii) that the type of decision we make tends to trigger areas of the brain with wellstudied propensities toward personal as opposed to impersonal actions, and (iii) that how
we make decisions has as much to do with the very nature of our wiring as it does with

putative wrongdoers finds himself. See generally, Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 368, 369 (1992); F. D. Fincham and T.R. Shultz, Attribution of
Responsibility: From Man the Scientist to Man as Lawyer, in 13 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 81 (L. Berkowitz, ed., 1981). I am addressing this question in The Problems With Blaming
(discussing, among other things, some of the phenomenological consequences of FAE). For a useful
work that ties FAE to the doctrinal anomalies of felony murder, to the attempt/completed crime
asymmetry in punishment, and to its affect on different theories of punishment that defy the formal
principle of grading, see Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the
Social Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383 (2003).
48

See note –, supra.

Page 16 of 17

whether we pursue a retributivist or utilitarian agenda.49
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See, e.g., Greene et al., supra note # –, Joshua D. Greene., from Neural “Is” to Moral
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